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ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY, TECHNICAL CHANGE AND GROWTH IN A
MODEL OF OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
Abstrac t
The consequ ences of private reprodu ction and capital (physic al and human)
accumul ation decision s to long-run economi c developm ent have been the focus 9f
recent research . The earlier literatu re on the rate of growth of populati on,··
labour force and human capital were assumed to be exogeno us. The recent
literatu re, in contras t, explici tly recogniz es their endogen eity. In
addition , greater emphasis is placed on human as contrast ed with physica l
capital in the growth process.
Another strand of recent literatu re, labeled as "new" growth theory, is
based on a mislead ing charact erizatio n of traditio nal neoclas sical growth
theory, namely, that it shows the steady state growth rate of income to be
exogeno us, and will equal the rate of growth of the labour force in the
absence of exogenou s technica l change. Thus in the steady state per worker
output and consump tion are constan t. A goal of 'new' theory is essentia lly to
endogen ize growth and to obtain sustaine d growth in per worker output and
consump tion, primari ly by generati ng increasi ng scale economi es in aggrega te
product ion. The resultin g nonconv exities lead to multiple equilbr ia and
hystere sis in some models.
The perceive d problem s with the neo-cla ssical growth model are not
inheren t features of the model, but the conseque nces of assuming that the
margina l product of capital diminish es to zero as the input of capital is
increase d indefin itely relative to labour. Instead of directly relaxing this
assumpt ion, the 'new' growth theoris ts in effect introduc e a factor other than
physica l capital which is not subject to such inexorab le diminish ing returns.
We take a differen t approach : we assume fertilit y and savings to be endogeno us
so that the rate of growth, labour and capital, and hence aggrega te growth, to
be endogen ous. Second, we assume that populat ion density has an externa l
effect (not perceive d by individu al agents) on the product ion process either
through negative congesti on effect or through positive effect in stimula ting
innovat ion and technic al change, so that the change in product ion
possibi lities is endogeno us determin ed by fertilit y decision s of individu al
agents. Our model is not necessa rily geared to generati ng balance d growth
steady states and its non-line ar dynamics generate a plethora of outcomes that
include not only the steady state of the neo-cla ssical model, but also growth
paths not only without a steady state but are even chaotic. Per capita output
grows exponen tially (and super exponen tially) in some of the example s.
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Lakshmi Raut, University of California, San Diego
and
T. N. Srinivasan, Yale University, New Haven

1.

Introduction

The consequences of private reproduction and capital (physical and human)
accumulation decisions to long-run economic development have been the focus of
research of a number of scholars in recent years (National Research Council
(1986), Nerlove et al (1987), Raut (1985, 1991a, 1991b), and Simon (1977,
1981)). In the earlier literature on growth and development household
formation, schooling, fertility and labour force participation decisions of
households, their mortality experience and the resulting rate of population
and labour force growth were assumed to be exogenous. The recent literature,
in contrast, explicitly recognizes their endogeneity.

In addition, greater

emphasis is placed on human as contrasted with physical capital in the growth
process.
The starting point of another strand of recent literature, labeled as
"new" growth theory, is a misleading characterization of traditional
neoclassical growth theory, namely, that it shows the steady state growth rate
of income to be exogenous, and, in the absence of (exogenous) technical change
(of a Harrod-Neutral type), this growth rate of income will equal the rate of
growth of the labour force.
consumption are constant.

Thus in the steady state per worker output.and
A goal of 'new' theory is essentially to endogenize

growth and to obtain sustained growth in per worker output and consumption,
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primarily by generating increasing scale economies in aggregate production.
The resulting nonconvexities lead to multiple equilbria and hysteresis in some
models.
It should be emphasized that per capita output can grow indefinitely even
in traditional growth models if the marginal product of capital is bounded
away from zero as the capital-labour ratio grows indefinitely.

Thus the

neoclassical assumption that the marginal product of capital is a strictly
decreasing function of the capital-labour ratio is not inconsistent with
indefinite growth of per capita output.

It has to diminish to zero as the

capital labour ratio increases indefinitely to preclude such growth.
Consider, for example, the simplest version of the neoclassical growth
model (Solow (1956)).

With a constant savings rates, a constant rate of

growth n of the labour force, no depreciation of capital and full employment
the rate of growth k of the capital labour ratio k is given by

(1)

k

sf(k) - nk

where f(k) is average product of labour given constant returns to scale.

It

is straightforward to see that if f(0) = 0 and the marginal product of
capital, i.e. f'(k), is bounded away from n/s, that is, if f'(k) > n/s for all
k, then k > 0 for all k.

This in turn implies that the rate of growth of

per worker output and consumption, namely f'(k)k/f(k), is positive.
Moreover, given strict diminishing returns, i.e. f"(k) < 0, ask->~, f'(k)
has a limiting value, say g, exceeding n/s.

As such it can be verified that

the asympotic growth rate of output and consumption will equal sg - n > 0.
Since this is a function of g which is endogenous, growth is endogenous. To
the extent the savings rate

s

is influenced by thriftiness of

intertemporal preferences influence growth.

households,

However, it should be noted that

if we assume that labour is essential to production, that is, output is zero

l
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if labour input is zero regardless of the level of capital input however
large, then the limiting value of f'(k) has to be necessarily zero.

Thus for

the limiting value to be positive a necessary condition is that labour is not
essential to production.
Solow (1956) also showed that if the production function is such that the
marginal product of capital increases up to some capital-labour ratio k and
then decreases thereafter, multiple steady state equilibria are possible in
each of which per capita output is constant but different across equilibria.
Further, there is hysteresis in the sense that depending on the initial
capital-labour ratio, per capita output will converge to different steady
states.

Based on this model, one can (and did!) make a case for a "big" push

investment to escape from convergence to a stable low level equilibrium to a
higher level equlibrium, a case that has been recently rediscovered and
extended (Murphy et al (1989)).

In these models, human capital plays no role.

Lucas (1988), on the other hand, postulates a production function to skill
formation at the individual level that assumes that the rate of accumulation
of skills is proportional to the level (or stock) of skills.

Thus the

marginal product -of the stock of skills in terms of the rate of accumulation
is a constant, given the time devoted to such accumulation.

In addition he

assumes that the average skill level of the entire labour force induces an
externality to the production process, thus obtaining indefinite increasing
returns to scale at the economy-wide level with respect to physical capital,
labour force and its average skills.

This naturally enables him not only to

endogenize growth but also obtain a positive and sustained rate of growth of
per capita output.

Strictly speaking, even if the externality effect is

absent, the assumption that the marginal product (in terms of rate of skill
accumulation) of the stock of skills is constant rather than diminishing to
zero is enough to obtain sustained growth.

In Romer (1986) the stock of
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-private knowledge at the level of the firm can be augmented through investment
I in research through a constant returns to scale production function using I
and k as inputs with bounded average product per unit of k.

Thus there are

strong diminishing returns to knowledge accumulation at the level of an
individual firm.
productivity.

However, aggregate knowledge has increasing marginal

Thus both Lucas and Romer in effect make assumptions that are

analogous to the assumption in the Solow model that the marginal proudct of
physical capital is bounded away from zero.
obtain sustained growth of per capita income.
(1986) assume fertility to be exogenous.

Thus it is no surprise that both
Both Lucas (1988) and Romer

Ehrlich and Lui (1989) analyze a

model in which human capital is the engine of growth and generate growth in
per capita income and consumption as a result of accumulation of general and
specific knowledge.

They link longevity, fertility and economic growth

through their interaction

with human capital accumulation in an overlapping

generations model with fertility as one of the endogenous choice variables.
It is clear that the two perceived problems with the neo-classical growth
model, namely, that aggregate growth rate in the steady state is exogenous
independent of intertemporal preferences and sustained growth in per capita
income can come about only if there is (exogenous) technical progress are not
inherent features of the model but the consequences of assuming that the
marginal product of capital (or more generally of any reproducible factor)
diminishes to zero as the input of capital (or that factor) is increased
indefinitely relative to other inputs.

Instead of directly relaxing this

assumption about production technology, the 'new' growth theorists in effect
introduce a factor other than physical capital (stock of skills in Lucas
(1988), general knowledge in Romer (1986) etc) which is not subject to such
inexorable diminishing returns.

We take a different approach in this paper:

first, by assuming fertility and savings to be endogenous, we make the growth
in both inputs, labour and capital, and hence

aggregate growth, to be
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endogenous in the absence of technical change.

Second, by assuming that

population density has an external effect (not perceived by individual agents)
on the production process either through negative congestion effect or through
positive effect in stimulating innovation and technical change, we make the .
change in production possibilities to be endogenous determined by fertility
decisions of individual agents.

-

However, unlike the "new" growth literature,

our model, which is an extension of Raut (1985, 1991a), is not necessarily
geared to generating balanced growth steady states'.

In fact, the non-linear

dynamics of the model generates a plethora of outcomes (depending on the
functional forms, parameters and initial conditions) that include not only the
neo-classical steady state with exponential growth of population with constant
per cpaita income and consumption, but also growth paths which do not converge
to a steady state and are even chaotic.

Per capita output grows exponentially

(and super exponentially) in some of the examples.

2.

Technological Change Induced by Population Density: A Model

E. Boserup (1989) and J. Simon (1981) among others have argued that the
growth of population could itself induce technical change.

In the Boserup

model increasing population pressure on a fixed or very slowly growing supply
of arable land induces changes in methods of cultivation, not simply through
substitution of labour for land by choice of techniques within a known set of
techniques but, more importantly, through the invention of new techniques.
Simon also attributes a positive role for increases in population density in
inducing technical progress.

Neither of the two authors provides a complete

theory of induced innovation.

We do not provide one here either: we believe

that the inducement to innovate will depend largely on the returns and risks
to resources devoted to innovative activity and there is no particular reason
to suggest that pre-existing relative factor prices or endowments will
necessarily tilt these returns towards search of technologies that save
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particular factors.

Instead, we simply analyze the implications of assuming

that technical change is influenced by population density (strictly speaking,
population size) in a world where fertility is endogenous.
More precisely, we assume that technical change in our model economy is
Hicks-Neutral and its rate is determined by the change in the size of the
working population.

However, for both consumers and firms in this economy

this {s an externality.

We introduce this externality in a model of

overlapping generations in which a member of each generation lives for three
periods, the first of which is spent as a child in the parent's household. The
second period is spent as a young person working, having and raising children,
as well as accumulating capital.

The third and last period of life is spent

as an old person in retirement living off support received from each of one's
offspring and from the sale of accumulated capital.

All members of each

generation are identical in their preferences defined over their consumption
in their working and retired periods.

Thus, in this model the only reason

that an individual would want to have a child is the support the child will
provide during the parent's retired life.

Production (of a single commodity

which can be consumed or accumulated) is organized in firms which buy capital
from the retired and hire the young as workers. Markets for product, labour
and capital are assumed to be competitive.
Formally, a typical individual of the generation which· is young in period

1

2

t has nt children (reproduction is by parthenogenesis!), consumes ct' ct+l
in periods t and t+l, and saves St in period t.
labour for wage employment.

She supplies one unit of

Her income from wage labour while young in period

t i s Wt and that is the only income in that period.

A proportion~ of this

wage income is given to parents as old age support.

While old in period t+l,

she sells her accumulated saving to firms and receives from each of her
offspring the proportion~ of his/her wage income.

1

2

u(ct' ct+l) from consumption.

She enjoys a utility

Thus her choice problem can be stated as:
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Maximize u(c~, c!+l) with respect to the non-negative variables c~,
2
ct+l' St and nt subject to:

(2.1)

(2.2)

where et is the output cost of rearing a child until young, qt+l is the price
of capital in period t+l and Wt is the wage rate in period t where the
numeraire in each period is that period's output.
It should be noted that restricting St to be non-negative implies that the
young cannot borrow and spend more than their income (net of payment to their
parents) to consume and spend on rearing children.

This is a natural

requirement since the only persons with resources to lend to the young are the
old. But they will not lend since they will be dead when the loan is to be
repaid.

Of course, if there is a government, it can tax the old to transfer

income to the young, but for the present let us assume that there is no
government.

Requiring nt to be non-negative is also natural given that nt are

the number of offspring, though treating it as a continuous variable, while
convenient, is not so natural!

But leaving aside the absurdity of having a

negative number of children, formally not allowing nt to be negative is
analogous to precluding borrowing.

After all, borrowing is simply one way of

increasing current consumption at the expense of future consumption.

Letting

nt be negative will also increase current consumption at the expense of future
consumption.
The firms of period t buy capital from the old at a price qt per unit, pay
wages at the rate of Wt per worker and maximize profits.

Thus if they buy Kt

units of capital and hire Nt workers, their profits ~tare given by
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(2.3)

where F(Kt,Nt) is a linear homogeneous function with strictly convex isoquants
(which implies that Fis concave) and G(Lt) is the Hicks-Neutral productivity
parameter that is assumed to depend on the number of young in period t. Of
course if there is full employment Nt will equal Lt.

Capital depreciates

completely within one period.
Clearly the first order conditions for profit maximization (for t=O,
1,2 ... ) are:

(2.4)

(2.5)

where Fi is the partial derivative of F with respect to its ith argument.

It

should be noted that in deriving (2.5) it is assumed that the producer chooses
Nt without taking into account that under full employment Nt will equal Lt and
hence affect G(Lt).

In other words, the possible effect of Nt on G(Lt) is an

uninternalized externality for the producer.

If we assume that both inputs

are essential to production so that F(O,N) = F(K,0)

0 for all N > 0, K > 0,

then positive production implies that (2.4) and (2.5) hold as equalities.
Since Fis homogeneous of degree one in Kand N, Fi is
zero in Kand N.

homogeneous of degree

Thus Fi (i = 1,2) is a function only of the ratio Kt/Nt. As

such, the fact that (2.4) and (2.5) have to hold as equalities restricts the
admissible set of qt,Wt.

Put another way, qt/G(Lt), Wt/G(Lt) have to lie on

the factor price frontier associated with F.

Given an admissible pair (qt,

wt) the profit maximizing value of Kt/Nt = kt is solved from
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(2.6)

Assume that F satisfies the Inada conditions, that is
Lim
k -> 0

ro

and

Lim

k ->

ro

0. Then since

is a decreasing

function of kt (because of strict convexity of isoquants of F), we obtain a
unique solution for kt as a function of qt/Wt from (2.6).

The strict

convexity of isoquants of Falso ensures that kt is indeed a profit maximizing
choice.
The first order conditions for consumer utility maximization are (fort
0, 1, 2, ... ) :

(2.7)

1
with equality if ct>
0

(2.8)

with equality if ct+l > 0

(2.9)

with equality if nt > 0

(2.10)

with equality if St> 0

2

where Ui is the partial derivation of u with respect to its ith argument and
At is the lagrangean multiplier associated with the budget constraint in
period t.
If we assume that

u

does not admit a satiation point, At and At+l will

be positive and if both commodities are essential in consumption, then (2.7)
and (2.8) will be equalities.

For the model to be meaningful nt and St have

to be positive: if either is zero, since capital and labour are essential to
production, the economy ceases to exist in period t+l!

Thus
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(2.9) and (2.10) have to be equalities as well which in turn means that
(2.11)

q

a

t+l

9t

w

t+l

This is nothing but the arbitrage condition that the return from investing a
unit of current income in physical capital, i.e. qt+l• is the same as the
return a/St in investing it in and rearing l/9t children and obtaining a
return of~ Wt+l from each.
To proceed further with the analysis, one needs to specify the nature of
dependence of St on t.

To the extent St reflects the cost of parent's time,

one may wish to make it a function of the ruling wage rate.

Besides, one may

also wish to incorporate the "environmental" effects of population density in
child rearing costs.

Setting St equal to 9G(Lt) + ~Wt will accomplish both.

However, this formulation is much too general for analysis and only by
restricting the form of utility and production functions it is possible to
proceed further as in Sections 3b, 4a and 4b.

However, if we set~= 0 and St

is a constant for all t, without such restrictions it is possible to obtain
some results.

3a.

We discuss this case in Section 3a.

Constant Child Rearing Costs: General Solution

With St a constant 9 for all t, (2.11) uniquely determines qt+1/wt+l or
equivalently

(qt+1/G(Lt+1))/(wt+l)/G(Lt+1)) as a function of a/S for all t.

This, together with the earlier result that qt/(G(Lt), Wt/G(Lt) lie on the
factor price frontier for F uniquely determine qt/G(Lt), Wt/G(Lt) respectively
as constants q* and w* fort= 1,2, ...
constant q*/w* fort= 1,2 ...

This means that qt/wt is also a

Given the capital stock k 0 owned by the old and

the number L0 of young at period zero (as determined a period earlier by the
choice of the old living in period zero) and full employment of labour and
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capital-labour ratios from period 1 on are constant as determined by F1/F2 =
Thus, with full employment (Lt= Nt), kt= Kt/Lt is a constant k* for

q*/w*.

t = 1,2, ...

But Kt= Lt-1st and Lt= Lt-lnt so that k* = st/nt fort=

0, 1,2 ...
1
Using (2.11) in constraints (2.1) and (2.2) one observes that ct
2

(1-a)wt - (9nt+st) and ct+l = (9nt+st) qt+l ·

This means that 9nt+St (= Zt) '

is the choice variable for utility maximization.

The first order condition of

utility maximization is u1/u2 = qt+l· If we assume that consumption in both
periods is normal and that the marginal utility of consumption in either
period tends to

co

if consumption in that period tends to zero, then u1/u2 is

an increasing function of Zt rising from zero at Zt = 0 to

co

as Zt ->

co.

Thus

u1/u2 = qt+l can be solved uniquely for Zt as a function H(wt,qt+l) of Wt and
fort= 0,1,2 ... Since St/nt = k*, it follows that fort= 0,1,2, ...

qt+l

(3.1)

Now Wt= w*G(Lt) qt= q*G(Lt) fort= 1,2 ...

As such if there is no

technical change, i.e. G(Lt) = constant for all t, the economy settles into a
steady state nt - n*
from t = 1 on.

(e + k *)-1 H( w* ,q*) an d St= s * -- k*(e + k*)-1 H(w*,q*)

This is the result reported in Raut (1991).

constant, output per worker is constant from t = 1.

> 1
<

Clearly with kt

Depending on whether n*

the size of the economy increases, stays constant, or decreases to

zero as t ->

co.
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3b.

Constant Child Rearing Costs: Specific Examples

Suppose now that G(Lt) is not a constant.
assume that u(c~, c~+l) is (c~) 0 (c~+l)l- 0 .

To get some insight, let us
Then H(wt,qt+l) =

(1-o)(l-a)wt so that

(3.2)
(3.3)
(3.4)

n

Lt+l

~

t

,\

Lt+l
,\

(1-o)(l-a)
(8 + k)

LtG(Lt)

w* G(L)
t

or

where

(1-o)(l-a)w*
(8 + k)

Clearly the behaviour of Lt will depend on the function .\LtG(Lt).

If, for

instance, .\G(Lt) < 1 for all Lt> 0, then Lt will decrease over time and
converge to zero.
an economy.

Thus zero is the unique steady state value of Lt for such

Let us assume away this uninteresting scenario of a declining

economy and postulate that .\G(Lt) exceeds 1 for Lt in some interval (a,b)
where a~ 0 and b

~ ro

A plausible assumption is that G(Lt) increases (i.e.

there is increasing positive externality effect of population density) up to
some Lt= Land then decreases to zero (i.e. there is an increasing negative
externality_effect of congestion) as Lt increases further.

Alternatively, one

could ignore congestion effects and assume that G(Lt) is a logistic function
with a positive asymptote.

We explore both below.

It is clear from (3.3)

that a positive steady state value of Lt denoted by L*, if it exists, is
defined by .\G(L*) = 1. (Of course L = 0 is always a steady state.)
following two examples illustrate some of the possibilities.

The
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Let

Example 1

~e

G(L)

-(L-L)2/2

for

L

a unique maximum at L = 0.5 [L + (L2 + 4)1/2].

~

0.

The curve ALG(L) reaches

Let L > 0 and A~> 1.

Then there are two possible steady state values L* and L** given by L*
(2LogA~)l/2 and L** = L + (2Log A~)l/2.
2
> 0 and L* > 0 if eL /2 > A~.

L -

A~> 1, it is clear that L** > L

Since L > L*, the curve ALG(L) crosses the

45° from below so that the steady state L* is unstable.

If L ~ L** so that

ALG(L) is non-decreasing while crossing the 45° line from above at L**, L** is
locally stable so that Lt converges to L** (zero) for any L0 above L* (below
L*).

On the

Of course if L0 = L*, Lt remains unchanged at L* (Figure 1).

other hand, if L < L** so that ALG(L) is decreasing while crossing the 45°
line from above at L**, there is a possibility of a limit cycle or even
chaotic behaviour.

In this example L = 0 is a locally stable steady state.

In fact, for the following parameter values the Li-York sufficient condition
for chaotic behaviour (see Baumol and Benhabib (1989)), namely, that there
exist a value of L, say L0
= 1.70,

= 1, L = 2.0.

~

and L3 = 1.34.

,

such that L0 < L1 < L2 and L3 < L0 is satisfied: A

Setting L0 = 1.56, one obtains L1 = 2.41, L2 = 3.77

Chaotic behaviour of Lt can be seen in numerical simulations

of this case (see Figures 2a and 2b).
A= 1.2,

~

= 1, L = 0.7.

Convergence obtain for parameter values

In this case Lt converges to 1.3.

This is

illustrated in Figures 3a and 3b.
Let us assume that the values of the parameters A,~. Lare such that
L ~ L** so that limit cycles and chaotic behaviour are ruled out.

Then if

Lt starts from any value larger than L*, it converges to L**, and the economy
reaches a -stationary state with a constant working population, constant
capital labour ratio and hence constant output and wage per worker.

It is to

be noted that since 1** >Lin the steady state there is congestion in the
sense that G(1) is decreasing at 1**.

If the economy starts from any value
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less than L* it converges to zero.

Thus depending on the initial conditions

the economy either converges to a 'good' stationary state L** or collapses to
zero!

Example 2
G(L) = 1/(a + /3e-1L)

Let

where a> 0, /3 > A - a> 0, 1 > 0

It is easily seen that G' (L) > 0 for all L

~

0.

Clearly, there exists a un,ique steady state L* = l/1 Log (/3/A-a) > 0 at
which AG(L*)

1.

=

Now ¢(L)

=

ALG(L) is an increasing function of Land ¢'(L)

= AG(L) + ALG'(L) > AG(L) > AG(L*) = 1 for L > L*.
increasing function of L for L > L*.

Hence ¢(L) - Lis an

The steady state L* is unstable.

If the

initial Lis less than L*, then Lt converges to zero and if it is greater than
L* it diverges to infinity (Figure 4).

In the latter case, although the

working population increases beyond limit, output per worker converges to
G(~)F(k*,l) = (1/a)F(k*,l).

The wage rate, price of capital, and

consumption

in each period of life of each generation also converge to constants.

Thus an

ever increasing population enjoys an unchanging standard of living.
The above examples show that as long as productivity as a function of the
working population, that is G(Lt), is bounded above, there is no possibility
of sustained growth in output per worker in a laissez-faire competitive
equilibrium.

At best the economy may be able to support an ever increasing

working population at a constant wage if G(Lt) has a positive asymptote.

At

worst the economy will decline with the working population converging to zero
asymptotically.
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4.a

Time Varying Child Rearing Costs, Cobb-Douglas Production and Utility
Functions

Let us consider the case St= SG(Lt) + rJWt,

It is clear that the

arbitrage condition (2.11) continues to hold and, as such, the choice variable
for utility maximization is still Zt = Stnt + St,

As earlier, the first order

condition of utility maximization can be solved to yield Zt = H(wt, qt+1),
Using the arbitrage condition qt+1/wt+l = a/St in the first order conditions
for profit maximization, one gets as before F1[Kt+l• Lt+1J/F2[Kt+l• Lt+ll =
a/St,

Given our assumptions on F, this can be solved uniquely to yield kt+l =

Kt+1/Lt+l = h(a/et), where his a strictly decreasing function falling from
as a/et-> 0 to zero as a/St->

Noting that Kt+1/Lt+l = St/nt, we solve

00 •

for nt and St to obtain (for t=O, 1, ... ):

(4.1)

nt

H(wt,qt+l)
et+ h(a/et)
h(a/et)H(wt,qt+l)
et+ h(a/et)

(4.2)

st

(4.3)

w

(4.4)

wt+l

G(Lt+l)

(4.5)

qt+l

G(Ltiif' [h(a/St)]

0

)
)

G(L )[f(k) - k f' (k ]
0

0

0

0

t

~

0

where k = K /L.
0

0

0

[f[h(a/8t)] - h(a/St) f' [h(a/St)]]

t

(4.6)

Lt+l

(4.7)

et

Lt

~

0

nt

8G(Lt) +

rJ

Wt

-

It is not easy to derive even the qualitative properties of the solution
to the above set of difference equations.

Once again to gain some insights

let us assume as before that the utility function is (c~) 0 (c!+ 1 ) 1 - 0 and

ro
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further the production function F(K,L) is K0 Ll-a.
(a/1-a)(a/St)- 1 and H(wt, qt+l) = (1-S)(l-a)wt.

Then, h(a/St) =
The system of equations

(4.1)-(4.7) can be reduced to two basic difference equations.

(4. 8)

(4.9)

a

{1-S)] [
a(l-a)] [r,(l-a)kt
[ (1-a)
O
r,
a(l-a) + a
S+r,(1-a)kt

,,

{1-a) {1-S)

. As such, if

,,

(1-a) {1-S)

< 1 it is seen from

(4.9) that the working population converges to zero as t ->
the process G(Lt).

]

oo

regardless of

This holds even if G(Lt) is purely time dependent as for

example G(Lt) = (l+€)t with€> 0 so that total factor productivity grows
exponentially in time!

However the welfare u(c

2
1
c
) of each member of
t' t+l

the declining working population increases over time.

4b.

Cost of Child Rearing Proportional to the Wage Rate: Some Examples

Two special cases are of some interest.

Suppose 8 = 0 so that the cost of

rearing a child at time tis proportional to the wage rate at time t.
see from (4.9) that nt, the growth in working population, is a constant
n * = a(l-atfl-a)(l-a)
r,[a -a)+a]

* t.
Lt= L0 (n)

(independent of the process G(Lt)) so that

From (4.8) we note that

Then we

-17-

(4.10)

Log kt+l = Log G [Lt]+ Log a+ Log~ - Log a+ a Log kt

Denoting Log kt by Xt, Log G(Lt) by gt and Log a+ Log~ - Log a by w, the
solution to (4.10) is

+

(4.11)

X

0

a

t

+

a

T

If as in Example 2, G(L) =[a+ fie-~L]-1, a> 0, b > 0, ~ > 0, then G(L)
is bounded and converges to 1/a or 1/(a + fi) depe~ding as whether Lt->
(i.e. n* > 1) or Lt-> 0 (i.e. n* < 1) as t ->

w.

noting that O <a< 1, we can say that as t ->

w,

00

Hence using (4.11) and
Xt converges in either case.

The average and marginal product of labour, and hence the welfare of each
member of a generation, also converge to constants, with the working
population increasing indefinitely in the first case and dwindling to zero in
the second.

More generally, if G(L) > 0 is bounded above, then (4.11) implies

that (1-a)xt is bounded above as well, so that the welfare of each member of
any generation is bounded above, with the size of the working population
growing or dwindling depending on whether n* is greater or less than 1.
What if n* > 1 (so that Lt-> wast-> w) and G(L) is unbounded?

G(Lt) behaves (for large values of Lt) as eµLt
µLt

µL 0 (n*)t.

(µ

Suppose

> 0) so that gt behaves as

Then from (4.11) it follows that Xt+l (for large values oft)

is
(4.12)

Since n* > 1 > a, as t ->

w,

Xt+l behaves as µL 0 (n*)t/(l-a/n*) + w/1-a.

This

in turn means that kt behaves asymptotically as exp(µL 0 (n*)t/1 - a/n*) and the
average product of labour= G(Lt)k~ behaves as e(a + vLo)(n*)t where v is a
positive constant!

Thus one obtains super-exponential growth.

On the other

hand, if G(Lt) behaves like A(Lt)µ for large values of Lt(µ> 0 implies that

-18-

G(Lt) is still unbounded) then g(Lt) behaves likeµ log Lt= µ[logL 0 + tn*].
From (4.11) it can be shown that Xt+l behaves as µn*t/1-a large values oft.
This means that kt grows exponentially at the rate µn*/1-a.

With G(Lt)

behaving like [L0 (n*)t]µ = (L0 )µ (n*)µt, exponential growth of kt implies
exponential growth in the average and marginal product of labour and in the
welfare of each member of a generation.

4.c

Cost of Child Rearing Proportional to Externality Effect: Some Examples

The second special case is~= 0. This implies that the child-rearing cost
is proportional to the externality factor G(Lt) but does not depend on the
wage rate.

This is not an altogether implausible case if the factors that

bring about positive (or negative) externalities associated with population
density (e.g. congestion or economies of scale in schooling) also influence
the cost of child rearing.

The assumption that 8t = 8G(Lt) is a simple

representation of this effect.

Retaining the assumptions that both the

utility and production functions are Cobb-Douglas, we get the basic equations:

(4.14)

(4.15)

2

- n t" =(1-o)a(l-a)(l-a)
.
[a(l-a)+aJ8

(4.13)

kt+l=

Lt+l

_Q_

§.

1-a

a

and

or

G(Lt)

(1-o)a(l-a)(l-a)
[a(l-a)+a]e

2

[

_Q_

§.

1-a

a

Consider the case where G(Lt) = AL~.

G(Lt-1) ] a Lt

Substituting in (4.15), taking

logarithms of both sides, defining it+l = Log Lt+l and

-

W=

2

Log [ (1-o)a(l-a)(l-a) (
aA8 )
[a(l-a)+a]8
(1-a)a

(4.16)

w.

J

we get:

The solution of (4.16) is
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(4.17)

it

t
- N + Dlpl+ Dz

t

Pz

µa

1/2
1 + (1+4ga}
2

where pl

1/2
1 - (1+4ga}
2

Pz

The initial conditions D1 + Dz - w/µa = Log L0 and D1Pl + Dzpz - w/µa
Log L0 + Log n 0 determine D1 and Dz.

Of course n 0 depends on the given k 0

.

Solving for D1 and Dz, we get:
(4.18)

D = [ ( i + Log L
0
1
µa

(4.19)

D = [ ( N + Log L
0
2

)

(l-p ) + Log n
0
2

)

(p - 1) - Log n
0
1

µa

For small values of µa, (1 + 4µa)l/2

=1

(1 + 4µa)- l/Z

]

]

(1 + 4µa) - l/Z

+ 2µa, so that we see from (4.17)

that it= Log Lt grows asymptotically at the rate µa.
that Log kt+l also grows at the same rate as well.

From (4.15), it follows

Hence kt and Lt grow

super-exponentially.
Consider the initial values of L0 and k 0 given by:

(4.20)

(1-o}a(l-a}(l-a}
[a(l-a)+a]e

(4.21)

e
a
a
r-a

G(L )
o

k

2

a

k0

1

and

0

It is clear then from repeated application of (4.14) and (4.15) that kt and Lt
remain at L0 and k 0 so that these are steady state values.

Further, any

values other than these will lead to either L1 f L0 or k1 f k 0 or both so
that the economy will not be in a steady state.

If we assume that (4.20) and

(4.21) have unique solutions, then the steady state of the model is unique.
It is easily verified that if G(L) = A~, equations (4.20) and (4.21)
imply

w=

-µa Log L0 and n 0 = 1 so that from (4.18) and (4.19) we find D1

Dz= 0 so that the economy remains in a steady state from period zero.

The
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fact that other values

of k 0 and L0 can lead to super growth in this special

case of G(L) = AI.JL suggests that in the general model convergence to the
unique steady state is not assured.

It is also clear from (4.15) that if G(L)

is bounded, kt is bounded and if the right-hand side of (4.14) evaluated at
the upper bound (lower bound) of kt is less (greater) than unity, Lt declines
to zero (increases beyond limit) over time. However, with kt and G(Lt)
bounded, the average and marginal productivity of labour are bounded even if
Lt is unbounded.

Thus in the case of~= 0, as in the case of 8 = 0, we can

generate an economy with super exponential growth, an economy which eventually
disappears altogether or an economy with ever increasing labour force enjoying
bounded levels of living for appropriate choice of the functional form G(L)
and the initial conditions.

5.

Social Planner's Optimum and Public Policy Intervention to Sustain It
The discussion so far looked at laissez-faire competitive equilibrium

paths.

Since the framework involves an externality that is not

internationalized by any of the agents, it is worth examining the implications
of a social planner internalizing it and whether the social planner's optimum
can be realized as a private optimum given suitable public policy
interventions in the form of taxes and subsidies.
For this purpose let us assume that the social planner maximizes the
discounted sum (with a discount factor fi, 0 < fi < 1) of the utility of a
member of each generation multipled by the number of individuals in that
generation.

Since individuals consume only when they are working and when

they are old, generations are indexed by the period t when they are working.
In period 1, the number of persons in the last period of life (i.e. the number
of individuals of generation zero) and the number of working young (i.e. the
number of individuals of generation 1 which is also equal the total number of
children that members of generation zero had in period zero) are both

-21-

The planner can choose the nwnber

prodetermined L0 and L1, respectively.

of members of all subsequent generations, i.e. Lt fort~ 2.

The conswnption

of a member of generation zero in period zero also predetermined at c~.
in

But their conswnption ci in the last period of their life, namely,

period 1, (and hence their utility u(c~, ci) and the conswnption while
working and while old (and hence their utility) of all other generations,
(c~, c~+l) (t = 1,2, ... ), are subject to choice by the planner.

The

savings of a member of generation O while working is predetermined at s 0
while the savings of a member of every other generation, St (j = 1,2, ... ), are
For simplicity the cost of child-rearing is asswned

again subject to choice.

to be 9 per child at all t.

Thus the planner's problem then is to:

co

subject to

Maximize
t~

(5.1)

1
2
Lt-lCt + Lt(ct + St) + Lt+l8

(5.2)

Lo

(5.3)

Lt

1
L1, co

Lo, L1

~

i
0, ct

~

0

i

_1
co, so

1,2,

t

!:,

G(Lt)F(Lt-lst-1• Lt), t

1,2, ...

so

0, 1,2 ...

Asswning a solution exists and it is an interior one, the first order
conditions fort= 1, 2, ... are seen to be as follows (where Et is the shadow

1

2

price of constraint (5.1) at time t, ut = u(ct' ct+l)' rt= F(Lt-lSt-1,
Lt) and subscript j of a function denotes the partial derivative with respect

-22-

to its jth argument):

Choice Variable

First Order Condition

(5.4)

Lt-1 /3 t-l u2t-1

(5.5)

(5.6)

1
2
€t8 + €t+1<ct+l + St+l) + €t+2ct+2

(5.7)

13t+lut+l +
€t+l

[G1(Lt+1)Ft+l+G(Lt+1)Ft+l]
+
.
2
t+2
€t+2G(Lt+2)Fl
St+l

Now simplifying, (5.4)

~

(5.6) become

(5.4)'

(5.5)'

/3 t-l u2t-1

(5.6)'

Substituting then in (5.7), it is seen that

(5. 7)'

€t8 = 13t+lcut+l - u~+l
€t+l [G1(Lt+l) pt+l +
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Now (5.4)' - (5.7)' together imply that

(5.8)

(5.9)

t
ul

€t
et+l

t

et e
€+1

t+l 1
t+l
8t+l(ut+l _ ul ct+l- u2 c!+1l

G (Lt+l)

u2

Ft+l
1

and

et+l

+ G(Lt+l)

Gl(Lt+l) Ft+l ]
Ft+l
[1 +
2
t+l
G(Lt+l)F2

On the other hand, from the first-order conditions of private (consumer and
producer) optimizatio n (equations (2.4) - (2.11)) it is seen that

(5.10)

~
>.t+l

(5.11)

>.t
e
Xt+l

t
ul
2
ut

qt+l

a G(Lt+l)

G(Lt+l)

Ft+l
1

and

Ft+l
2

A comparison of (5.8) with (5.10) shows that if .:.t.._
et+l

~
>.t+l

given the same values for Lt and Lt+l• the private and socially optimal
consumption and savings decisions would be the same.

Now et/Et+l is the value

of a unit of output available in period t+l in units of output of period t,
i.e. it is the social discount factor for output, and >-t/>-t+l is the
correspondi ng discount factor in the private market equilibrium .

However, as

is to be expected, a comparison of (5.9) and (5.11) shows that even if there
were no externaliti es associated with population, i.e. G1(Lt+1) = 0 and that
Et/Et+l = >-t/>-t+l, private and social decisions with respect to fertility will
in general differ.

Even though the cost of an additional child, i.e. the cost

of child rearing, is the same for private and social
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decisions, under the assumption et/et+l

At/At+l• the benefits represented by

the right-hand sides differ.
A selfish parent in her private decision counts as benefit only the

proportion

g

of the wage G(Lt+1)F~+l earned by the additional child.

However, for the society there are three contributions of an extra child,
represented by three terms of the right-hand side of (5.9).

The

term(pt+l/et+l) (ut+l - u1+1 c~+l - u~+l c!+ ) represents (in
2
units of present value of output of period t+l) the contribution to welfare of
an extra person in period t+l, i.e. her utility ut+l net of the cost of her
t+l 1
2
lifetime consumption, i.e. ul ct+l + u2t+l ct+2
and for a
concave utility function this is non-negative (being zero for a linear
homogeneous utility function).

This term arises from the fact that social

welfare is utilitarian with respect to each generation in that it adds up the
utility of all members of the utility function in determining the contribution
of each generation to welfare.

Thus this contribution is Ltut.

If instead

one considered the contribution of each generation to be the welfare of a
representative agent, it would be only ut.

In the latter case, the first

order conditions (5.4)'-(5.6)' will remain unchanged and in (5.7)' (and hence
in 5.9) the first term will be absent.

Whether one should take a utilitarian

point of view is, largely though not entirely, an ethical issue (Koopmans
(1967) and Nerlove et al (1987)) which we do not wish to pursue here.

The

term G(Lt+1)F;+l is the contribution to output of an extra person in
period t+l and the last term G1(Lt+1)Ft+l is the externality effect of that
extra person.
It is evident from the above comparison if the planner with perfect
foresight can set taxes or subsidies on income transferred by a child to her
parent so as to reflect social considerations, thus making the net of tax or
subsidy contribution equal to the social value of an extra child, social
optimum can be realized as a private market equilibrium.
(r) (in fact, it is a subsidy since it is negative) is

The required net tax
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(5.12)

r =

8t+l

a

G(L

e

t+l

t+l

[ u t+l

)Ft+l
2

Thus, each parent in deciding how many children to have will take into
account that each child will provide a proportion~ of her wages to the parent
and the government will provide a proportion -r of each child's wage.

In all,

the parent, in her old age, received a proportion a - r (recall r < 0) of each
of her children's wage.
by a lump sum tax.

= 0) and if

u

By definition, the cost of subsidy will be financed

From (5.12) it is seen that if there is no externality (G1

is linear homogeneous r = a - 1 or a - r = 1.

This means that

fertility decisions would be made in the expectation that the entire wage of
each child will accrue to the parent in her old age!

6.

Conclusions
To conclude, with endogenous fertility and endogenous technical change

arising from externalities associated with labour force growth, the problem of
stagnant steady state per worker consumption (as in the neo-classical growth
model with exogenous fertility and no technical change) is not necessarily
avoided.

Whether in fact a steady state exists, whether it is unique and

stable and whether per capita consumption grows indefinitely all depend on
preferences, technology and the nature of externality associated with labour
force growth.

Only sound empirical research will shed light on this issue.

Private fertility decisions (under selfish preferences) may be non-optimal
from a social perspective even in the absence of externalities associated with
population growth.

Externality adds yet another reason for this divergence.

However, as is to be expected, a planner with perfect foresight can realize
the social optimum through private decisions by appropriately taxing or
subsidizing the intergenerational transfer that is distorted, namely, the
payment made by the working young to their parent.

1.
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Figure 2a
Parame ters A= 1.70, y = 1.0,
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